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Abstract
Relativizing computations of Turing machines to an oracle is a central concept in
the theory of computation, both in complexity theory and in computability theory(!).
Inspired by lowness notions from computability theory, Allender introduced the con-
cept of “low for speed” oracles. An oracle A is low for speed if relativizing to A has
essentially no effect on computational complexity, meaning that if a decidable language
can be decided in time f(n) with access to oracle A, then it can be decided in time
poly(f(n)) without any oracle. The existence of non-computable such A’s was later
proven by Bayer and Slaman, who even constructed a computably enumerable one,
and exhibited a number of properties of these oracles as well as interesting connections
with computability theory. In this paper, we pursue this line of research, answering
the questions left by Bayer and Slaman and give further evidence that the structure of
the class of low for speed oracles is a very rich one.
1 Introduction
The subject of this paper is oracle computation, more specifically the effect of oracles on the
speed of computation. There are many notable results about oracles in classical complexity,
beginning with the Baker-Gill-Solovay result [BGS75] which asserts that there are oracles A
such that PA = NPA, but that there are also oracles B such that PB 6= NPB (thus demon-
strating that methods that relativize will not suffice to solve basic questions like P vs NP).
An underlying question is whether oracle results can say things about complexity questions
in the unrelativized world. Eric Allender and his co-authors [ABK06, AFG13] showed that
oracle access to the sets of random strings could give insight into basic complexity questions.
For example, in [AFG13], Allender et. al. showed that ∩UP
RKU ∩ COMP ⊆ PSPACE where
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RKU denotes the strings whose prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity (relative to universal ma-
chine U) is at least their length, and COMP denotes the collection of computable sets. Later
the “∩COMP” was removed by Cai et. al. [CDE+14]. Thus we conclude that reductions to
very complex sets like the random strings somehow gives insight into very simple things like
computable sets.
Inspired by lowness notions in computability theory, Allender asked whether there were
non-trivial sets which were “low for speed” in that, as oracles, they did not accelerate running
times of computations by more than a polynomial amount. Of course, as stated this makes
little sense since using any X as oracle, we can decide membership in X in linear time, while
without oracle X may not even be computable at all! Thus, what we are really interested in
is the set of oracles which do not speed-up the computation of computable sets by more than
a polynomial amount. More precisely, an oracle X is low for speed if for any computable
language L, if some Turing machine M with access to oracle X decides L in time f , then
there is a Turing machine M ′ without oracle and polynomial p such that M ′ decides L in
time p◦f . (Here computation time of oracle computation is counted in the usual complexity-
theoretic fashion: we have a “query tape” on which we can write strings, and once a string x
is written on this tape, we get to ask the oracle whether x belongs to it in time O(1)).
There are trivial examples of such sets, namely oracles that belong to P, because any
query to such an oracle can be replaced by a polynomial-time computation. Allender’s
precise question was therefore:
Is there an oracle X /∈ P which is low for speed?
Such an X , if it exists, has to be non-computable, for the same reason as above (if X is
computable and low for speed, then X is decidable in linear time using oracle X , thus – by
lowness – decidable in polynomial time without oracle, i.e., X ∈ P).
A partial answer was given by Lance Fortnow (unpublished), who observed the following.
Theorem 1.1 (Fortnow). If X is a hypersimple and computably enumerable oracle, then X
is low for polynomial time, in that if L ∈ PX , then L ∈ P.
Allender’s question was finally solved by Bayer and Slaman, who showed the following.
Theorem 1.2 (Bayer-Slaman [Bay12]). There are non-computable, computably enumerable,
sets X which are low for speed.
Once their existence is established, it is natural to wonder what kind of sets might be low
for speed. A precise characterization seems currently out of reach, but it is interesting to see
how lowness for speed interacts with other computability-theoretic properties. One needs
however to keep in mind that lowness for speed is not closed under Turing equivalence: as
we saw above that in the 0 degree (computable sets) some members are low for speed and
others that are not (on the other hand it is easy to see that if A is polynomial-time reducible
to B and B is low for speed, then A is also low for speed).
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In his PhD thesis, Bayer showed that if X is computably enumerable and of promptly
simple Turing degree, then X is not low for speed, but also proved that this did not char-
acterize the computable enumerable oracles that are low for speed. Bayer also studied the
size of the set of low for speed oracles, where ‘size’ is understood in terms of Baire category.
Surprisingly, whether the set of low for speed oracles is meager or co-meager depends on the
answer of the famous P =?NP question.
In this paper, we continue Bayer and Slaman’s investigation on the set of low for speed
oracles. In the next section, we give an easier proof of the existence of non-computable low
for speed oracles which does not require the full Bayer-Slaman machinery (but the oracle
we construct is not computably enumerable). In Section 3, we focus on the computably
enumerable low for speed oracles, and prove that – quite surprisingly – they cannot be low
in the computability-theoretic sense, but can however be low2. Finally, we pursue Bayer and
Slaman’s idea to study how large the set of low for speed oracles is, in terms of measure and
category. In particular, we solve a question they left open by showing that the set of low
for speed oracles has measure 0 and obtain some interesting connections with algorithmic
randomness. Finally, though lowness for speed is not closed under Turing equivalence it is
nonetheless natural to ask which Turing degrees contain a low for speed member, which is
what Section 5 is about.
Throughout this paper, we will denote by {0, 1}∗ the set of finite strings. In our setting,
an oracle is a language, i.e., a subset of {0, 1}∗; however, as is typical in computability theory,
it is more convenient in some of the results we present below to view oracles as infinite binary
sequences (whose set we denote by {0, 1}ω), by first identifying finite strings with integers
(the (n + 1)-th string in the length-lexicographic order being identified with n) making the
oracle a subset of N (which is what we mean when we talk about a ‘set’ without further
precision) and then identifying the oracle with its characteristic sequence (the (n + 1)-th
bit is 1 if n belongs to the oracle, 0 otherwise. When building oracles X with certain
computability-theoretic properties, viewed as infinite binary sequences, we will often need
to refer to prefixes of X , which are themselves binary strings. To avoid confusion between
members and prefixes of oracles, we will use latin letters x, y, z, . . . to denote members of
oracles, and greek letters σ, τ, . . . for prefixes of oracles. Two strings σ and τ are incompatible
if for some i < min(|σ|, |τ |), σ(i) 6= τ(i). We denote this by σ⊥ τ . The join X ⊕ Y of two
infinite binary sequences X, Y is the sequence X(0)Y (0)X(1)Y (1) . . .. Finally X ↾ n is the
prefix of X of length n.
Our paper requires some knowledge of computability theory and algorithmic randomness.
One can consult the book [DH10] for the results and concepts we allude to below. Our
notation is mostly standard. We denote Cantor’s pairing function by 〈., .〉. We also fix an
effective list (Φe) of all oracle Turing functionals (or machines: Φ
A
e is the Turing machine of
index e with oracle A, which for a fixed A is a partial function from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}). For
a given functional Φe and oracle A, time(Φ
A
e , x) denotes the running time of Φe on input x
with oracle A (counting time according to the model of computation described above) and
time(ΦAe ) is the function x 7→ time(Φ
A
e , x). We let (Ri) be an effective enumeration of all
partial computable functions from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}. We denote the set of low for speed
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oracles by LFS, and the subset of LFS consisting of its non-computable elements by LFS∗.
2 Existence of non-computable low for speed sets
In this section we will present a simple proof of the existence of a non-computable low for
speed oracle. Define the set S of strings by S = {02
n
| n ∈ N} and let S be the set of ‘sparse’
sets of strings which only contain strings from S, that is, S = {X ∈ {0, 1}ω | X ⊆ S}.
By extension, we say that a string σ is in S if it is a prefix of some element of S. The
interest of the set S is that there are only O(n) strings in S of length n. Thus, given a Turing
machine Φ, it is possible to simulate in time poly(t) the behaviour of ΦX during t steps of
computation on all X ∈ S (an idea which is already present in the Bayer-Slaman argument
presented in the next section).
Theorem 2.1. There exists a non-computable X which is low for speed.
Proof. We want X to satisfy all requirements R(e,i), where e, i range over integers, defined
as follows
R(e,i): either Ri is partial, or Φ
X
e 6= Ri, or Φ
X
e = Ri but the computation of Ri via Φ
X
e
can be simulated by a functional Ψ running in time polynomial in time(ΦXe ).
We build our oracle X by finite extension. Let σ0 be the empty string. At stage s+ 1 =
〈e, i〉, do the following.
(a) If there is an n and a τ ∈ S extending σs such that Φτe(n) and Ri(n) both converge
and have different values, then let σs+1 be the first (say in length-lexicographic order)
such string τ .
(b) If there is no such string τ , then take σs+1 = σs0
Finally let X be the unique infinite sequence extending all σs. We claim that X is as
wanted. Let us first prove that X must be incomputable. Suppose X = Ri for a total Ri.
Let e be an index such that Φe is the identity functional. By construction, when choosing
the prefix τ of X at stage s + 1 = 〈e, i〉, we must be in case (a), and thus τ is precisely
chosen to ensure X 6= Ri, a contradiction. Let us now prove that X is low for speed. Fix a
pair (e, i) let s+ 1 = 〈e, i〉, and let us see how σs+1 was constructed. If we were in case (a)
at that stage, we have ensured Φσs+1e ⊥Ri and thus Φ
X
e ⊥Ri, thereby satisfying R(e,i). If we
were in case (b), there are three subcases:
• Either Ri is partial, then the requirement R(e,i) is satisfied
• Or there is an n such that Φτe(n) ↑ for any extension τ of σs, in which case Φ
X
e (n) ↑
and thus ΦXe 6= Ri should Ri be total.
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• Or, if we are in neither of the two above cases, for every n there is an extension τ
of σs such that Φ
τ
e(n) ↓, and for any such τ , we have Φ
τ
e(n) = Ri(n). In this case,
we can build a functional Ψ which computes Ri as follows. On input n, at stage t, it
computes Φτe(n) during t steps of computation for all τ ∈ S of length t extending σs. If
a τ is found such that Φτe(n) ↓, then we set Ψ(n) = Φ
τ
e(n). As we already mentioned,
there are only O(t) strings of length t in S and it is obvious that they can be listed
in polynomial time. Hence, simulating all computations Φτe(n) during t steps can be
done in time p(t) for some polynomial t. This shows that for any Y ∈ S extending σs,
if ΦYe (n) returns (the value of Ri(n)) in time t, this is found out by the procedure Ψ
at stage t, which corresponds to
∑
s≤t p(s)+O(1) steps of computation for Ψ, which is
also polynomial in t. This being true for any Y ∈ S extending σs, we have in particular
that time(Ψ) = poly(time(ΦXe )).
One should note that the case disjunction in this proof is a Σ1/Π1 dichotomy, and there-
fore one can carry out the construction below 0′, therefore establishing the existence of a
0′-computable set that is low for speed. This is weaker than the Bayer-Slaman result pre-
sented in the next section, which asserts the existence of a c.e. such set. However, this proof
is both simpler and, as we will see in the remainder of the paper, has further useful corollaries.
3 Computably enumerable low for speed sets
We now restrict ourselves to the computably enumerable (c.e.) sets, and study which of
these can be low for speed. For the sake of completeness, we present the main ideas of the
proof of Bayer and Slaman [Bay12] that there are indeed c.e. sets in LFS∗.
Theorem 3.1 (Bayer-Slaman Theorem). There exist c.e. non-computable sets that are low
for speed.
Proof sketch. The proof uses a tree-of-strategies argument. We need to satisfy
Pe : A 6=We,
and
Le,i : If Φ
A
e = Ri total, then some Ψ computes Ri in time polynomial in time(Φ
A
e ).
The Pe-strategy is a standard Friedberg-Muchnik strategy on a tree. A node ρ devoted to
this requirement picks a fresh follower x, waits for x ∈ We[s] and if this happens puts x
into A.
The basic strategy for Le,i is the following. First, throughout the whole construction
of A, we will promise that if we add an element x to A at stage t, then we must immediately
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also add all y ∈ [x, t] (this is often referred to as a dump construction). This way, at any
stage s, there will only be at most s strings α of length s that can potentially be a prefix
of (the final) A. And thus – just like in the previous section – at stage s, it is possible to
emulate all computations Φαe (x)[s] for all such α’s and x ≤ s in time poly(s).
When the strategy is eligible to act at stage s, for every x ≤ s on which Ψ is not
defined yet, it computes all Φαe (x)[s] for all potential prefixes α of A, and should one of them
converge, defines Ψ(x) to be the value of Φαe (x) for the α that has the fastest convergence.
If no Φαe (x)[s] converges, Ψ(x) remains undefined until the strategy is eligible to act again.
Now, if at some later stage we find a value x such that Ri(x) ↓ and Ψ(x) 6= Ri(x), then
we find the α such that Ψ(x) = Φαe and add elements into A so that α becomes a prefix of
A. This ensures ΦAe 6= Ri and terminates the strategy. All strategies of lower priorities are
then injured and must be reset. If we never find such an x, this means that either ΦAe is
partial, or Ri is, or Ψ = Φ
A
e = Ri and by construction the running time of Ψ is polynomial
in the running time of ΦAe .
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This is enough to ensure the success of the strategy in isolation. The difficulty comes
from the interaction with lower-priority strategies which might want to add elements into A.
The final key to the Bayer-Slaman proof is the following. Suppose that at some stage s a
strategy of lower priority wants to add an interval [y, s] of elements into A. The problem
is that the computations on this configuration might be slow. Perhaps for some x of length
≤ s we have not as yet seen ΦAs∪[y,s]e (x) ↓. Even more importantly, we don’t even know that
the value of this will agree with the value Ψ(x) we have already defined.
The idea is the following. Ri has to confirm the computations, that is, we wait until
Ri(x) converges on all x where Ψ has already been defined. When (and if) this happens,
we must have Ψ(x) = Ri(x) for all such x otherwise we would be in the above case where
we can ensure ΦAe 6= Ri and satisfy the requirement. If this never happens, our requirement
will be satisfied because Ri would be partial. And if it does happen, then we can safely add
[y, s] to A because if this causes ΦAe (x) to change, it will yield Φ
A
e (x) 6= Ri(x) which satisfies
the requirement. But there is one last problem: while waiting for this confirmation, the
construction of Ψ cannot wait as we need it to be as fast as ΦAe . The crucial trick is, from
the point of view of our strategy, to carry on as if [y, s] had already been enumerated into A.
Indeed, if the confirmation ever happens, the elements of [y, s] will be truly enumerated into A
which Ψ will have correctly assumed ahead of time, and if the confirmation never happens, Ψ
might be wrong (i.e., Ψ 6= ΦAe ) but this will not matter because in this case Ri will be either
partial or different from ΦAe . Of course, when the confirmation never occurs the strategy of
lower priority never gets to enumerate into A the elements it wants. This is where we make
use of a standard tree construction where strategies of lower priorities guess the outcome of
strategies of higher priority. We refer the reader to [Bay12] for details.
Within the c.e. sets, would one expect a set to be low for speed to have low or high
1Actually, there is a subtlety here: one must ensure that the strategy for Le,i is eligible to act often
enough, i.e., allowed to act for the n-th time before stage q(n) for some polynomial q, but this can easily be
ensured.
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information content? In particular, one would expect that a low for speed c.e. set would be
one with little computational power, in the same way that sets low for 1-randomness are all
(super-)low (see Nies [Nie09]). The next theorem is therefore quite surprising.
Theorem 3.2. If A is c.e. and of low Turing degree (i.e. A′ ≡T ∅′), then A is not low for
speed.
Proof. Assume that A is not computable, is c.e., and is low. Let (Φe, pe) be an enumeration
of pairs of one functional and one polynomial with coefficients in N. We will build a Turing
functional Ψ and a computable set R such that ΨA = R. This is our global requirement and
we make the following global commitment: if a value R(n) gets defined at some stage, ΨX(n)
is immediately defined to be equal to R(n) for all X ’s on which ΨX(n) is still undefined. We
want to satisfy, for each e:
(Re) : Φe does not compute R in time pe(time(Ψ
A))
thus proving that A is not low for speed. The strategy for a single requirement (Re) is the
following. Throughout the construction, we build a ‘verifier’, i.e., a partial computable S
such that S(e, .) is the attempt by the (Re)-strategy to guess A. We also define an auxiliary
functional Θ common to all strategies whose index we know in advance, and use the lowness
of A to obtain a computable 0-1 valued function h(., .) such that limt h(e, t) exists for all e,
and equals 1 when ΘA(e) ↓, 0 otherwise. (Informally, ΘX(e) ↓ means that a prefix of X is
believed to be a prefix of A at some stage of the strategy for (Re), and this will cause the
strategy to enter Case 3 as described below.)
At the initial stage s1, S is empty and we pick a first fresh witness w1 larger than any
integer mentioned so far in the construction and define ΨAs1 ↾1(w1) = 0. Let t1 be the time
this computation takes. Now, check whether Φe(w1) returns in pe(t1) steps. We distinguish
three cases:
Case 1: Φe(w1) returns 1 in ≤ pe(t1) steps. In this case, we set R(w1) = 0 and R(n) = 0
for all n ≤ w1 on which R is still undefined, and commit to having ΨA(w1) = 0 even after
potential future A-changes. This way we ensure Φe 6= R = ΨA, thus immediately satisfying
(Re), and we stop the strategy for this requirement.
Case 2: Φe(w1) returns 0 in ≤ pe(t1) steps. In this case, we do not define R(w1) just
yet. Instead, we set S(e, 1) = As1 ↾ 1. We then create a second witness w2 at stage s2
and proceed as above for this new witness (with As2 ↾ 2 in place of As1 ↾ 1). And so on:
for further occurrences of this case, the procedure will extend S and create a witness w3 at
stage s3 looking at prefixes of length l = 3, etc (and if Case 2 then causes a reset, we stay
at the same level l when resetting). Meanwhile, we continue to monitor A. Again, there are
two subcases for a given l:
(a) At some point we discover that Asl ↾ i is not in fact an initial segment of A, we are
then free to set R(wl) = 1 (which will guarantee Ψ
A(wl) = 1 = R(wl) 6= Φe(wl) since
we only committed to Ψσ(wl) = 0 for σ’s that are not prefix of A), and this way we
have satisfied (Re). We then stop the strategy.
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(b) Asl ↾ l is a true initial segment of A, in which case nothing further will happen regard-
ing witness wl. What is gained is that S(e, l) will be defined to be Asl ↾ l = A ↾ l, thus
progress was made towards computing A.
Case 3: Φe(w1) is still undefined after pe(t1) steps. In this case, we set Θ
As1 ↾1(e) ↓ (which
should be interpreted as signalling that we have entered Case 3). Observe that is As1 ↾ 1
is a true prefix of A, this implies ΘA(e) ↓ and therefore we would have limh(e, t) = 1. We
distinguish two subcases
(a) The current value h(e, s) is 0. Then we wait for a stage t > s such that either h(e, t) = 1
or At ↾ 1 6= As ↾ 1 (one of the two must happen as we explained above). If the former
happens first we move to subcase (b) below. If the latter happens first, we restart the
procedure resetting s1 to the current stage t and keeping the same w1.
(b) The current value h(e, s) is 1. We then set R(w1) = 0, set R(n) = 0 for all n ≤ w1 on
which R is still undefined and terminate the strategy for now. However, if at a later
time t > s, we see that h(e, t) = 0 and At ↾ 1 6= As1 ↾ 1, then we resurrect the strategy
and start over at the level i where we left off.
We claim that this strategy satisfies the requirement (Re). If Case 1 happens for any
witness wl, the requirement is satisfied. Case 3a can only happen finitely many times at a
given level since as Asl ↾ l can only change finitely many times. Case 3b can only happen
finitely many times across all levels as each passage through this case causes a flip of h(e, .),
and we know h(e, .) converges. Case 2b can also happen only finitely often, because each
time we go through this case and do not get to diagonalize, S(e, .) computes a longer initial
segment of A, but A is incomputable so S(e, l) would eventually have to be wrong.
Thus we either eventually end up in Case 1 (and immediately succeed) or Case 2a (and
immediately succeed) or a terminal Case 3b, i.e., the strategy enters Case 3b and stays there
forever. It remains to check this last scenario. Suppose the terminal Case 3b happens for
some Asl ↾ l which is not a prefix of A, this means that Ψ
A(wl) has not been defined yet and
thus, should nothing else happen, we would have limt h(e, t) = 0 and would see a change in
A ↾ l, thus leaving this occurrence of Case 3b, a contradiction. So Asl ↾ l is indeed a prefix
of A and by construction ΨA(wl) returns 0 = R(i) in a number of steps t while Φe(wl) does
not return in less than pe(t) steps, thus the requirement is satisfied. It is now straightforward
to satisfy all requirements by ordering them in order of priority, noticing that each strategy
only makes finitely many changes to R before achieving its goal and R is total as every time
R(w) becomes defined, so do the R(n) for n ≤ w that were previously undefined.
It is important to note that the above result fails to hold outside of the c.e. setting.
Theorem 3.3. There exists a low, non-computable set X which is low for speed.
Proof. See Section 5.
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We next ask whether Theorem 3.3 is tight in terms of the lowness/highness hierarchy.
Recall that A is low2 if A
′′ ≡T ∅′′.
Theorem 3.4. There is a low2 c.e. set that is low for speed.
Proof. This time we must build A to satisfy additionally to Pe and Le:
Ne : (Φ
A
e is total)→ (Θe is total).
where (Θe) is a sequence of functionals we build.
The basic idea is that at stages where the length of convergence ℓ(e, s) = max{x | (∀y ≤
x) ΦAe (y)[s] ↓} increases we would like to preserve this computation and set Θe(x) ↓. We
think of this having subrequirements Ne,x devoted to preserving ΦAe (x)[s].
There is an apparent conflict between our requirements. Suppose we have three require-
ments Ni, Lj , Pk, in decreasing order of priority, and Pk believes that Lj will have infinitary
outcome. At some point, Pk wants to enumerate some element x into A. As we saw in the
previous construction, Lj will start behaving as if x had already entered, while Pk waits for
confirmation before actually doing so. However, if at some point in the process Ni imposes
a restraint containing x, this will prevent x from entering A and thus destroys Lj’s plan to
add x after confirmation, and the functional Ψ built by Lj might just be wrong. One can
check that any other interaction between requirements does not cause any conflict.
The solution to the problematic case is to look closer at the tree of strategies. If the
strategies for Lj and Pk are working under the assumption that Ni has finitary outcome
(waits forever to preserve ΦAe ↾ x for some x), there is no problem: if it is indeed the case
they will not be bothered by any restraint Ni might impose, and if they are wrong they
will not be on the true path anyways. So the problematic case only happens if they are
working under the assumption that Ni has infinitary outcome (arbitrarily long restraints).
The idea is, under the assumption that the requirement Ni has infinitary outcome, to break
it down to subrequirements Ni,x devoted to preserve ΦAi ↾ x) and place them below on the
tree, interleaved with other strategies. So now we are down to the case where Lj and Pk
are working below an Ni,x, under the assumption that Ni has infinitary outcome. But then
there is no problem at all: because of the infinitary assumption, the strategies for Lj and Pk
can both wait for Ni,x to place its restraint, and then only allow bigger elements to enter A,
thus respecting this restraint.
There is no other difficulty to take care of when putting the strategies on a tree, except a
small detail: when an N -strategy operate below an L-strategy assuming infinitary outcome,
when the L strategy behaves as if some x has already entered A, then so should the N -
strategy. The rest is routine.
We can also combine the the same ideas (dump construction together with awaiting for
certification) with the standard proof that there exists an incomplete c.e. set A of high Turing
degree (i.e., A′ ≡T ∅′′) to get the following.
Theorem 3.5. There is a high c.e. set A which is low for speed.
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Note that we do not say in the theorem that A is Turing incomplete, because this in fact
follows from lowness for speed, as we will see in Proposition 5.7.
4 How big is LFS?
Bayer and Slaman showed that whether LFS is meager or not... depends on the answer
to P vs NP question! More precisely, if P = NP, then LFS is co-meager (more precisely,
every 2-generic is low for speed), while if P 6= NP, then LFS is meager (more precisely,
every recursively generic is not low for speed). They left as an open question whether LFS
has measure (Lebesgue) 0 or 1 (by Kolmogorov’s 0/1-law, it has to be one or the other).
One might expect that, just like the meagerness of LFS depends on the P vs NP question,
its measure depends on complexity-theoretic assumptions, such as the ‘P vs BPP’ question.
This is not the case: we show that LFS is – unconditionally – a nullset.
Theorem 4.1. The set LFS has measure 0. Indeed, no Schnorr random is low for speed.
Proof. We first build a computable set R with the following properties: (1) the set R con-
tains at most one string of any given length and (2) for all e, if Φe computes R, then
time(Φe, x) > 2
|x| for almost all x. To do so, we declare at the beginning of the construction
all indices e ‘active’, and for every n in order, do the following. We compute Φe(x) during
2|x| of computation for all x of length n and all currently active e ≤ n. If for some pair
(e, x) we see that Φe(x) converges, we take the smallest such pair in the lexicographic order
(smallest e first, then smallest x), we diagonalize against Φe by setting R(x) = 1 − Φe(x)
(thus ensuring Φe 6= R), as well as R(y) = 0 for all y 6= x of length n, and then declares e
inactive from now on. If no such pair (e, x) exists, set R(y) = 0 for all y of length n. This
finishes the construction of R. It is clear that R is computable (it is even in EXPTIME)
and that it contains at most one string of each length. To verify property (2), suppose Φe
computes R, and observe that for any x such that time(Φe, x) ≤ 2|x|, the only way Φe can
escape being diagonlalized against by R is when some Φi with i < e is diagonlized against
on strings of length n, but this can only happen e times. Thus if Φe does indeed compute R,
it must do so in time 2|x| for almost all x.
Now we need to see how to speed up computations with a Schnorr random oracle. Con-
sider the following procedure Ψ. Given oracle Z and input x, ΨZ(x) first splits Z (viewed
as a binary sequence) as Z = ζ1ζ2 . . . with |ζi| = i and ΨZ(x) returns 0 if x = ζ|x| (thus the
resulting computation is polynomial in |x|), and ΨZ(x) = R(x) otherwise, using a fixed pro-
cedure to compute R. So there is a polynomial p such that for any Z, time(ΨZ , x) ≤ p(|x|)
for infinitely many x’s. Furthermore, we can only have ΨZ(x) 6= R(x) if x = ζ|x| and ζ|x|
happens to be the only string of its length in R. This has probability at most 2−|x| (‘at most’
because R can also have no string of length |x| at all) if Z is chosen at random. This means
that, by setting Cn = {Z | (∃x) |x| = n ∧ ΨZ(x) 6= R(x)}, we have λ(Cn) ≤ 2−n.
The Cn’s are uniformly computable clopen subsets of {0, 1}ω because Ψ is a tt-functional.
Thus, a Schnorr random A can only belong to finitely many Cn’s (see for example [Bie08,
Lemma 1.5.9]), meaning that ΨA(x) = R(x) for almost all x. Thus there is a finite variation
10
Ψˆ of Ψ such that ΨˆA = R, and ΨˆA(x) is computed in polynomial time for infinitely many x
while time(Φi, x) > 2
|x| for any Φi computing R and almost all x. This shows that A is not
low for speed.
On the other hand, we will see in the next section that LFS is large in the set-theoretic
sense, namely that it has the size of the continuum.
Finally, there is one last notion of size for subsets of {0, 1}ω that is dear to computability
theorists, namely, a set is ‘large’ if it contains a Turing upper cone and is ‘small’ if it disjoint
from a Turing upper cone. Martin’s Turing determinacy theorem tells us that any Borel set
which is closed under Turing equivalence must be either large or small on this account. The
set LFS is indeed Borel (this is easy to see from the definition), but it is not closed under
Turing equivalence, so Martin’s theorem does not apply. In the next section, we will use a
classical result from complexity theory to show that LFS is in fact disjoint from a Turing
upper cone (Theorem 5.8).
5 Lowness for speed and Turing degrees
While lowness for speed is not closed under Turing equivalence, the following question is
nonetheless interesting:
Which sets are Turing equivalent to some low for speed X? Which sets compute some
non-computable low for speed X?
We denote by LFS and LFS∗ the set of Turing degrees that contain a low for speed set and
a non-computable low for speed set, respectively. One of the main results of Bayer [Bay12]
is that not all degrees are in LFS. Indeed, there exists a c.e. degree a /∈ LFS. The main
question left open by Bayer regarding LFS is whether it is downward closed under ≤T or
closed under join. We give a negative answer to both questions. To show that it is not
downward closed, we need the following extension of Theorem 3.2 to degrees.
Theorem 5.1. For any low c.e. degree a > 0, we have a /∈ LFS.
Proof. We now suppose that A only is of c.e. degree (as opposed to being c.e.) and is low.
Let (As) be a ∆
0
2 approximation of A, and let µ be its modulus of convergence, i.e., µ(n) is
the smallest s such that all {At | t ≥ s} have the same prefix of length n (which must thus
be the prefix of A of length n). Observe that µ is a lower semi-computable function, and let
µs be its approximation at stage n (setting µ0(n) = 0 for all n).
The fact thatA has c.e. degree is equivalent to the fact that µ isA-computable (see [Soa16]),
so let M be a functional such that MA(n) = µ(n) for all n. Consider the set {X ∈ {0, 1}ω |
MX(n) = k}. This is an effectively open set, uniformly in (n, k) and thus can be represented
by a c.e. set of strings that are pairwise incomparable for the prefix relation (by this, we
mean that an X is in M−1(n, k) if and only if one of these strings is a prefix of X), and this
representation is effective and uniform in (n, k). We call P (n, k) the set of strings which both
11
belong to this set and are a prefix of some approximation As of A. Observe the following
easy facts:
(i) P (n, k) is c.e. uniformly in (n, k)
(ii) P (n, k) is finite for all (n, k).
(iii) If k 6= k′, then any two strings σ ∈ P (n, k) and τ ∈ P (n, k′) are pairwise incomparable
for the prefix order.
(iv) A has a prefix in P (n, µ(n)) for all n (and thus no prefix in other P (n, k) for k 6= µ(n)
by the previous fact).
Facts (i), (iii) and (iv) follow directly from the definition. Fact (ii) holds because the
sequence (As) pointwise converges.
We now adapt the construction of R and Ψ as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. The strategy
to win against a pair (Φe, pe) still works by levels, with a verifier S which this time attempts
to compute µ (it will eventually fail because if µ were computable, so would be A), and again
an auxiliary functional Θ, with h(., .) a computable approximation of ΘA, by lowness of A.
Also, as before, as soon as R(n) becomes defined, ΨX(n) is immediately set to be equal to
R(n) for any X on which ΨX(n) was still undefined. Our strategy starts with l = 1 and S
undefined everywhere, and does the following. First, it looks at the current value k = µs(l)
and starts enumerating P (l, k). When a new string σ enters P (l, k), we pick a fresh witness
w = w(l, σ) for this σ, set Ψσ(w) = 0, look at the number t of steps this computation takes,
and compute Φe(w) during pe(t) steps of computation. Once again, there are three cases
which will require different actions for this σ:
Case 1: Φe(w) returns 1 in ≤ pe(t) steps. In this case, we set R(w) = 0 and R(n) = 0
for all n below the current stage on which R is still undefined, and stop the strategy forever.
Case 2: Φe(w) returns 0 in ≤ pe(t) steps. We set S(e, l) = k. We then start again the
procedure with l + 1 and
(a) If at some point we discover that µ(l) > k, we are then free to set R(w) = 1, R(n) = 0
for all n below the current stage on which R is still undefined, and stop the strategy
forever.
(b) µs(l) = µ(l), in which case S(e, .) has made progress towards computing µ.
Case 3: Φe(w) is still undefined after p(t) steps. In this case, we set Θ
σ(e) ↓. We have
the same two subcases as before:
(a) The current value h(e, s) is 0 (here, this should be interpreted as the fact that ∅′
currently does not believe that any of the strings that have been enumerated so far in
P (l, k) and reached Case 3 is a true initial segment of A). Then we wait for a stage
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t > s such that either h(e, t) = 1 or to see a new σ enter P (l, k), or to see an increase
of µ so that µ(l) > k. If h(e, t) = 1 happens first, we move to subcase (b) below. If a
new σ enters P (l, k), we set R(w) = 0 and R(n) = 0 for all and run the strategy on
the new σ. Finally, if µ(l) increases above k, then we know that we have not seen any
prefix of A yet at this level, so we restart the procedure at the same level with the new
value of k.
(b) The current value h(e, s) is 1. We then set R(w) = 0, set R(n) = 0 for all n below
the current stage on which R is still undefined and terminate the strategy for now.
We resurrect the strategy at this level if we see either a new σ entering P (l, k) or an
increase in µ(l).
On top of the action for a single σ that enters P (l, k), if at any point of time we see a τ
that enters P (l, k), picks a witness wτ and lands in Case 1 or Case 2, then we immediately
stop the action of the other σ’s that we have seen so far in P (l, k), and for all of those, copy
the action of τ on witness wτ . This is in fact only important in Case 2, the reason being
that we do not want the action of a ‘bad’ σ (i.e., not a true prefix of A) to interfere with the
strategy on a good σ that enters Case 2, as the bad σ would otherwise (by going through
Case 3 and defining R(n) for the n needed by the good σ).
The rest of the verification is pretty much the same as before, with the additional point
that we can only go through Case 3 finitely often at a given level because h can only flip
finitely many times and P (l, k) is a finite set, and go through Case 2b only finitely often
otherwise S(e, .) would be a computation of µ.
Corollary 5.2. LFS is not downward closed under ≤T , even within c.e. degrees.
Proof. Let a > 0 be a c.e. degree in LFS whose existence was explained in Section 3. By
Sacks’s splitting theorem [Sac63], there is a low c.e. degree 0 < b < a. By Theorem 5.1,
b /∈ LFS.
The next theorem will show that while not every c.e. degree contains a low for speed
member, every non-zero c.e. degree a bounds a degree b ∈ LFS. Recall Bayer’s result that
whether 2-generics are low for speed or not depends on the ‘P vs NP’ question. When it
comes to the degree of generics, we have that every 1-generic is Turing-equivalent to a set
that is low for speed, independently of complexity-theoretic assumptions.
Theorem 5.3. Every 1-generic degree g belongs to LFS.
Proof. We get this result by refining the proof of Theorem 2.1. In that proof, we built an X
low for speed by finite extension, and ensuring that X was a subset of S = {02
n
| n ∈ N}.
For G ⊆ N, let SG = {02
n
| n ∈ G}. We claim that when G is 1-generic, SG = {02
n
| n ∈ G}
is low for speed (and clearly SG ≡T G). In the proof of Theorem 2.1, if we let U⌉,〉 be
the effectively open sets of those Z such that for some n, ΦSZe (n) and Ri(n) both converge
to different values, we know that G, being 1-generic, is either in Ue,i (hence satisfying the
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requirement Re,i as per case (a)), or in the interior of the complement of Ue,i, which precisely
corresponds to case (b), hence the requirement is also satisfied in this case.
We can derive a number of useful corollaries from this theorem. First of all, we see
that LFS has the size of the continuum since G 7→ SG is one-to-one, and there are continuum
many 1-generic G. We also get an immediate proof of Theorem 3.3 that asserts the existence
of a set of low degree that is low for speed.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Take a ∆02 1-generic G; the corresponding set SG is low for speed
and is low as it is both ∆02 and of GL1 (Indeed a result of Jockusch [Joc80] states that
every 1-generic degree G is GL1, that is, G
′ ≡T G⊕ ∅′; when G ≤T ∅′, this is equivalent to
G′ ≡T ∅′).
A similar idea allows us to show that LFS contains a non-trivial interval in the Turing
degrees.
Corollary 5.4. There is a degree a > 0 such that every 0 ≤ b ≤ a is in LFS.
Proof. By a result of Haught [Hau86], if a is a ∆02 1-generic degree, every b > 0 below a is
of 1-generic degree. Then the result follows immediately from Theorem 5.3.
Another interesting corollary is that every non-computable c.e. set bounds a non-computable
low for speed set. Likewise almost every set, in the measure-theoretic sense, bounds a non-
computable low for speed set.
Corollary 5.5. Every non-zero c.e. degree bounds a member LFS∗, every 2-random degree
bounds a member of LFS∗.
Proof. This is simply because every non-zero c.e. degree and every 2-random degree bounds
a 1-generic degree [Kur81, Kau91].
Theorem 5.6. There are a,b ∈ LFS such that a ∨ b /∈ LFS
Proof. Let G0 be 2-generic, i.e., 1-generic relative to ∅′. Consider G1 = G0∆∅′ where ∆ is
the symmetric difference. It is easy to check that G1 is also 2-generic. Thus SG0 and SG1
(defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.3) are both low for speed but SG0⊕SG1 ≥T G0⊕G1 ≥T
G0∆G1 = ∅′, so by the previous theorem, deg(SG0 ⊕ SG1) /∈ LFS.
After generic degrees, let us move to random degrees. We have seen in Theorem 4.1 that
LFS is a nullset, and in fact no Schnorr degree is low for speed. Interestingly, this result does
not extend to Turing degrees: by a result of Nies et al. [NST05], every high degree has a
Schnorr random member and we have seen that there is a low for speed of high degree. This
leaves open the possibility that almost all X are Turing-equivalent to a low for speed set.
This would be similar to the category situation where – under the reasonable assumption
P 6= NP – the set LFS is meager (as proven by Bayer and Slaman) but the set of A’s whose
degree is in LFS is co-meager (Theorem 5.3). This is not the case however: if we increase
the algorithmic randomness level from Schnorr randomness to Martin-Lo¨f randomness, then
the distinction disappears.
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Proposition 5.7. If a is, or simply bounds, a Martin-Lo¨f random degree then a /∈ LFS
(equivalently: if A ∈ {0, 1}ω computes a Martin-Lo¨f random, A is not low for speed).
Note that this shows in particular that {A | deg(A) ∈ LFS} has measure 0, and also that
any A ≥T ∅′ is not low for speed, as Chaitin’s Ω number is Martin-Lo¨f random and Turing
equivalent to ∅′.
Instead of proving Proposition 5.7 directly, we will prove the following stronger theorem.
Theorem 5.8. If a is a DNC degree, then a /∈ LFS (equivalently: if A ∈ {0, 1}ω computes
a DNC function, A is not low for speed).
Proposition 5.7 follows from this theorem because DNC degrees are closed upwards, and
by a result of Kucˇera [Kucˇ85], every Martin-Lo¨f random degree is a DNC degree.
Proof. The proof of this theorem relies on the proof of a classical computational complexity
theorem, namely Blum’s speed-up theorem [Blu71] (see also [Koz06, Theorem 32.2]), which
asserts that for every sufficiently fast growing computable function f , there exists a com-
putable set R which admits no fastest algorithm in that for every i such that Φi = R, there
is a j such that Φj = R and f(time(Φj , x)) ≤ time(Φi, x) for almost every x.
Let us first discuss how to prove Blum’s speed-up theorem. As it happens, we have already
seen a proof with similar features, namely the proof of Theorem 4.1 (this is no coincidence,
as it is the proof Blum’s speed-up theorem that inspired this other proof). We build R
by diagonalization against all Φi, where for all x in order we try to find an active i ≤ |x|
such that Φi(x) converges in less than f
|x|−i(|x|) steps (here the exponent is understood as
composition: f 0 is the identity, and fn+1 = f ◦ fn) and if such an i is found, we diagonalize
against Φi by setting R(x) = 1 − Φi(x) for the smallest such i, and declare i inactive from
that point on. If no such i is found, set R(x) = 0. Obviously R is computable, and the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that for any Φi computing R, one must have
time(Φi, x) ≥ f |x|−i(|x|) for almost all x. Now, suppose Φe is a functional that computes R.
We need to show that there is another functional which computes R much faster than Φe.
Fix a large k and assume we are given as ‘advice’ the finite list σk of indices i < k such that
Φi eventually gets diagonalized against (and therefore i becomes inactive) in the construction
of R. Now, we can compute R via the following procedure. In a first phase, simply follow the
construction of R as described above, until we reach a point where all i ∈ σk have become
inactive. At this point, we know (only because we know σk!) that none of the {Φi | i < k}
are relevant for the construction of R on future x. Thus, we enter a second phase where to
compute each R(x), we only need to simulate, for k ≤ j ≤ |x|, Φj(x) during f |x|−j(|x|) steps
of computation. By dovetailing, this can be done in poly(|x| · f |x|−k(|x|)) (the polynomial
being independent of k) which, if f is fast growing enough and k large enough compared to e,
is < f
(
f |x|−e(|x|)
)
, which in turn is < f(time(Φe, x)) for almost all x (note that such a k can
be computed uniformly given e), and this finishes the proof of Blum’s speed-up theorem.
Looking more closely, the core of the argument is that for a given x and a given i, if we
somehow knew that Φi is not diagonalized againstexactly at that point x, then we can save
the computation of Φi(x)[f
|x|−i(|x|)] in the computation of R(x). We already see why DNC-
ness naturally comes into play. Let θ : N→ {0, 1}∗ be the partial computable function such
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that θ(i) is the one string x on which Φi is diagonalized against during the construction of R,
and θ(i) ↑ if there is no such x. Having a DNC function as oracle allows us to find, for any
given i, a y 6= θ(i) should θ(i) be defined, and thus one can speed up a bit the computation
of R(y) for this y. In fact we can do much better: by a result of Jockusch [Joc89], having
access to a DNC function allows us to uniformly avoid a finite number of values of a given
partial recursive function. Here this means that with our DNC oracle, we can, uniformly
in k, find a y /∈ θ(i) for any i < k on which θ is defined, or equivalently, a y such that none
of the Φi with i < k gets diagonalized at y. Applying Blum’s argument, one can indeed
use this information to truly speed up the computation of R(y). We are not quite done yet
however: our argument shows that once we have computed y from k we can speed-up the
computation of R(y), but the computation of y itself might take a long time and offset the
time we save on the computation of R(y).
To overcome this problem, we need to refine the above idea. Let 〈., ., .〉 be the canonical
‘tripling’ function: 〈a, b, c〉 = 〈a, 〈b, c〉〉 and for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, let πi3 be the i-th projection
(πi3(〈x1, x2, x3〉) = xi, note that these function are polynomial-time computable). Since A
has DNC degree, again using Jockusch’s result, A computes, via a fixed functional Ξ, a
function F such that F (k) 6= π23(θ(i)) for any i < k on which θ is defined (here and in
the rest of the proof we identify strings and integers). Said otherwise, for any pair (a, c) of
integers, none of the functionals {Φi | i < k} gets diagonalized against at y = 〈a, F (k), c〉.
Now let Ψ the functional which computes R as follows using oracle A. On input x, it
first computes the projections of x, i.e., finds k, l,m such that x = 〈k, l,m〉. Then, it tries to
compute F (k) via Ξ and using oracle A during m steps of computation. If it fails to do so, it
then computes R(x) using a fixed procedure (with no access to the oracle) and returns this
value. If it does succeed to compute F (k), it then checks whether l = F (k). If not, ΨA(x)
again returns R(x) using a fixed procedure to perform the computation, without access to
the oracle. Finally, and this is the interesting case, if F (k) is computed in ≤ m steps of
computation, and l = F (k), we know by definition of F that none of the {Φi | i < k} gets
diagonalized against at x. Thus ΨA can compute R(x) by only simulating, like in the proof of
Blum’s theorem Φj(x) during f
|x|−j(|x|) steps of computation for k ≤ j ≤ |x|. In that case,
the total computation time is still poly(|x| · f |x|−k(|x|)) because the m steps of computation
needed to get F (k) are simply poly(|x|). For a given k, taking m sufficiently large will give
enough time for the computation of F (k) by A, and make x = 〈k, F (k), m〉 large enough to
ensure that the computation time of ΨA(x) is < f(time(Φe, x)), as long as f is sufficiently
fast growing. This shows that A is not low for speed.
As an immediate corollary, we get the result mentioned in the pervious section that LFS
is disjoint from a cone in the Turing degrees, again because DNC degrees are closed upwards.
Another interesting consequence is that the analogue of the low basis theorem for Π01 class
does not extend to lowness for speed: it is not true that every non-empty Π01 class contains
a member of low for speed degree. For example, one can take a Π01 class of Martin-Lo¨f
randoms: all its elements have DNC degree by Kucˇera’s theorem, and thus do not have low
for speed degree.
At this point, we know that the set of X ’s which compute a member of LFS∗ is very
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large: it has measure 1 and is co-meager, it contains every c.e. set, etc. We might even start
thinking that every non-computable X computes a member of LFS∗. This is not the case
however, as shown by the following theorem (which contrasts Corollary 5.4).
Theorem 5.9. There is a degree a > 0 such that no 0 < b ≤ a is in LFS∗. Indeed, a can
be chosen to be a minimal Turing degree.
Note that another way to obtain a degree a > 0 such that no 0 < b ≤ a is in LFS∗
is by taking a to be a hyperimmune-free degree containing a Martin-Lo¨f random member,
which ensures that hat every 0 < b ≤ a also computes a 1-random (see [DH10, Corollary
8.6.2]), and apply Proposition 5.7. However, the existence of a minimal low for speed degree
is interesting in its own right.
The classical construction of a minimal degree is done by forcing over total computable
function trees (here we follow the terminology of [Soa16]). A function tree is a partial
function T : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such that if either T (σ0) or T (σ1) is defined, then all of
T (σ), T (σ0) and T (σ1) are, and T (σ0) and T (σ1) are strict extensions of T (σ) such that
T (σ0)⊥T (σ1) (we say that T (σ0) and T (σ1) split T (σ)). We say that σ is a node of T if
σ ∈ rng(T ). A tree S is a sub-f-tree of T , which we denote by S 4 T when every node of
S is a node of T . An infinite binary sequence Z is a path on an f-tree T if infinitely many
prefixes of Z are nodes of T . The set of paths of T is denoted by [T ]. An f-tree naturally
extends to a functional from {0, 1}ω to {0, 1}∗∪{0, 1}ω by setting T (X) =
⋃
σ4X T (σ) When
an f-tree T is total, this extension is an homeomorphism from {0, 1}ω to {0, 1}ω, and if T is
furthermore computable, its inverse T−1 is also computable. Given a functional Φe, we say
that T is e-consistent if for any two nodes σ and τ on T and any n, if Φσe (n) and Φ
τ
e(n) are
both defined, then they are equal; in this case, for any path X of T , ΦXe is either partial or
computable. We say that T is e-splitting if T is total and for any σ, Φ
T (σ0)
e and Φ
T (σ1)
e are
incomparable; in this case, the restriction of Φe to [T ] is total, one-to-one, and its inverse is
computable.
The key lemma in the construction of a minimal degree states that for any total com-
putable f-tree T and every e, there is a total computable sub-f-tree S of T which is either
e-consistent or e-splitting. Then an X ∈ {0, 1}ω of minimal degree is obtained by taking a
sufficiently generic filter G over the set of total computable f-trees ordered by 4, and take
the intersection of their sets of paths (the non-computability of X can be further ensured
by remarking that for any σ, the set of computable f-trees whose nodes are all incomparable
with σ is a dense set for the order 4, thus one can choose X to avoid any fixed subset of
{0, 1}ω, such as its computable elements).
We are going to prove Theorem 5.9 by showing that taking a sufficiently generic filter for
the order 4 ensures lowness for speed as well. For this, we will make use of the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.10. Let T be a total computable f-tree. There exists a total computable f-subtree
S 4 T none of whose paths is low for speed.
Proof. The functional T−1 : [T ] → {0, 1}ω is total on its domain, which is a Π01 class, and
thus is a tt-reduction by effective compactness. Let f be a computable time bound for
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the running time of T−1, that is, for any Y ∈ [T ], whether x ∈ T−1(Y ) can be decided
in time f(|x|) with access to oracle Y . Now, let L be a computable set that cannot be
computed in time 2f(n+1). Let S be the sub-f-tree of T defined by S(σ) = T (σ ⊕ L) (where
σ ⊕ L = σ(0)L(0) . . . σ(k − 1)L(k − 1) when k = |σ|). The paths of S are exactly the sets
of the form T (X ⊕L) for some X . Each of them computes L in time f(n+ 1) by definition
of f , which is exponentially faster than any procedure computing L without oracle by our
assumption on L.
Proof of Theorem 5.9. Let T be a total computable f-tree and Φe a functional. As we ex-
plained earlier, the usual construction of a minimal degree shows that there is S 4 T which is
either e-consistent or e-splitting. In the case S is e-consistent, we are satisfied (this guaran-
tees ΦAe to be either partial or computable). If it is e-splitting, we further refine S as follows.
Since S is e-splitting, we consider the total computable f-tree S ′ corresponding to the image
of S by Φe: S
′(σ) = Φ
S(σ)
e (this is indeed an f-tree precisely because S is e-splitting). By the
previous lemma, there is a total computable S ′′ 4 S ′ none of whose paths is low for speed.
Now the pullback T ′ = Φ−1e (S
′′) is a total computable f-subtree of T , which forces ΦAe to not
be low for speed.
Thus we can force for all e that ΦAe is partial or not low for speed, and force A to be of
minimal degree and be non-computable as usual.
We do not know whether or not all sets of minimal degree are in fact non-low for speed.
Remark 5.11. Another way to prove Theorem 5.9 is to use Kumabe ans Lewis’s theorem
that there exists a minimal degree of DNC degree [KL09], and apply Theorem 5.8, but our
proof is more informative, as it also shows that lowness for speed is a generic notion for
forcing with total with computable f-trees.
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